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Iceland’s 
contested 
European Policy: 
The Footprint of 
the Past - A 
Small and 
Insular Society 
 
Iceland’s domestic politics and foreign affairs 
are undergoing drastic changes. After an 
economic crash, violent protests on the streets 
of Reykjavik for the first time in Iceland’s 
history contributed to the defeat of the 
government. The party system has been 
altered. A turn has been taken towards Europe 
after the United States left the island, first by 
closing its military base in 2006 and then by its 
clear stance not to assist the country in its 
economic difficulties. The former close 
relations with the superpower are unlikely ever 
to be restored. The EU membership application 
is placing severe constraints on political parties 
which are split on the issue and has put in 
jeopardy the unity of the first left majority in 
the Icelandic parliament, the Althingi. Society 
is in a state of flux after an unprecedented 
economic downscaling and the collapse of 
almost its entire financial sector – which had 
boomed rapidly beginning in the mid-1990s. 
The credibility of politicians, the parliament 
and the media is in ruins. 
 
Iceland’s smallness and its location on the 
geographical map – one could also say the 
geopolitical map – has had a profound 
influence on its domestic and foreign affairs. 
Iceland is closely associated with the other 
Nordic states and has adopted many of their 
domestic characteristics, with important 
exceptions. On the other hand, the country has 
come under American influence – 
geographically, it straddles the Mid-Atlantic 
rift – and has limited its participation in the 
European project. Its geographical location in 
the middle of the North Atlantic has led to a 
notion that the country’s culture is unique and 
should be protected by all available means. 
Politicians continue to play the ‘nationalistic 
uniqueness’ card with considerable success 
even though the country has been swept by 
globalization. Rapid modernization (which 
only really began in the Second World War 
with British and American occupations) and 
sudden engagement with the outside world 
(which only extended to the general public in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century) are 
still slowly but steadily making their mark on 
the country’s foreign policy. The country’s 
political discourse and foreign policy still bear 
the hallmark of the past, i.e. of a small and 
insular society 
 
This paper will address the political 
developments in Iceland since the 2008 
economic crash and place it in a historical 
context. The aim is to understand Iceland’s 
present foreign policy and, in particular, the 
highly contested decision by its government in 
2009 to apply for membership of the European 
Union. The paper is divided into five sections 
in addition to this introduction and the 
concluding remarks. First, it starts by 
explaining the importance in Iceland of a 
political discourse based on the concept of 
independence which dates back to the 
historical narrative of the settlement period. 
This section will also examine Iceland’s close 
relations with the other Nordic states – despite 
important differences between it and the 
others. Second, the paper will analyse the 
importance of the party system, i.e. the 
dominance of the centre-right in Icelandic 
politics, and the changed nature of the system. 
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Third, it examines how Iceland further 
distinguishes itself from the other Nordic states 
in many important features. Fourthly, the paper 
analyses the country’s three main foreign 
policy priorities in the post-war period, i.e. 
extensions of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
firm defence arrangements with the US and 
membership of NATO, and the drive for better 
market access for marine products – including 
a partial engagement in the European project. 
Fifthly, the paper examines how the country’s 
smallness, in terms of its central administrative 
capacity, has affected its domestic and foreign 
policy-making. The concluding section 
summarizes the main findings concerning the 
political and historical obstacles that the Social 
Democratic Alliance faces in its hard-fought 
battle to change the country’s European Policy. 
 
From settlement to republic: 
Maintaining close ties with other 
countries in the North 
 
Iceland achieved Home Rule in 1904 after 
having been part of the Danish kingdom for 
centuries. Icelanders commonly refer to the 
first four centuries from the settlement of the 
country by Scandinavians (largely from 
Norway, but with an admixture of Norse and 
also Celtic elements from the British Isles) in 
the
 
ninth century as the Icelandic 
Commonwealth. During this time, Iceland was 
in close contact with its neighbours in North-
Western Europe, entities which are now 
referred to as Norway, Greenland, the Faroe 
Islands, the Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands, 
Denmark and Sweden. One could say that 
these entities formed a common market and 
were politically closely intertwined – despite 
ongoing violent disputes in Scandinavia. 
 
Iceland became part of the Norwegian 
kingdom after the mid-thirteenth century, 
having maintained close ties with the 
Norwegian rulers ever since the settlement. A 
century later, the Norwegian kingdom was 
united with the Danish one under the Kalmar 
Union. It also included Sweden and the islands 
mentioned above and lasted until the first 
quarter of the 16
th
 century. Iceland’s union 
with Denmark lasted until 1944. 
 
Icelandic governments have always 
emphasised a close relationship with the 
country’s neighbouring states and its most 
important trading partners. Its closest contacts 
have been with the other Nordic states, 
particularly Denmark, as well as Britain and 
the US. Iceland became a sovereign state in 
1918 and was in full charge of its foreign 
policy from that time onwards, though 
Denmark undertook to implement this policy. 
In 1940, due to the German occupation of 
Denmark, Iceland took full charge of its 
foreign relations and set up its own Foreign 
Service. Iceland had peacefully struggled for 
independence (mostly by legal means) for over 
a century and 1944 saw the dissolution of the 
union with Denmark and the creation of the 
Icelandic Republic. The population at the time 
was about 127,000. 
 
There is a tendency to ignore the international 
environment which triggered various steps 
which led to full independence. The 
independence struggle is seen by many 
Icelanders as having been won by national 
unity built on Icelandic culture and uniqueness 
ably led by distinguished national heroes.
1
  The 
image of Iceland being capable of achieving 
self-determination without the need to 
participate in multilateral cooperation within 
international institutions as a kind of protection 
                                                 
1 Hálfdanarson, G. (2001), Íslenska Þjóðríkið: Uppruni 
og Endimörk, Reykjavík, Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag, 
pp. 45-47. 
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forum, led Icelandic politicians to lay more 
emphasis on bilateralism.
2
 
 
Moreover, relations with the Nordic states, the 
states to which Icelanders feel closest
3
, have 
been characterized by co-operation rather than 
integration. Iceland became a founding 
member of the Nordic Council, created in 
1952, together with Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden (Finland joined in 1956). Ambitious 
schemes have been proposed concerning 
Nordic integration, but most of them have 
failed
4
 and instead lesser schemes have been 
implemented, the most notable one being a 
passport union which Iceland joined in 1955
5
, a 
common labour market agreed in 1952 and 
extended to Iceland in 1982 and the right of 
migrant Nordic citizens to claim social security 
and other social rights
6
 on the same basis as the 
host state’s own nationals. Although much has 
been achieved under the umbrella of the 
Nordic Council (such as scientific, academic 
and cultural activities), the success of Nordic 
cooperation rests more on “shared culture and 
                                                 
2 Thorhallsson, B. (2005), ‘What features determine 
small states’ activities in the international arena? 
Iceland’s approach to foreign relations until the mid-
1990’s’, Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla – A Web-based 
Magazine, 1(1), pp. 107-140 
3 Harðarson, Ó.Th. (1985), ‘Icelandic security and foreign 
policy: the public attitude’, Cooperation and Conflict, 20(4), p. 
310. 
4 Thomas, A.H. (1996), ‘The concept of the Nordic region and 
the parameters of Nordic cooperation’, in L. Miles (ed.), The 
European Union and the Nordic Countries, New York, 
Routledge, pp. 15-31. 
5 'Norden 1954. Protocol Concerning the Exemption of 
Nationals of the Nordic Countries from the Obligation to 
Have a Passport or Residence Permit While Resident in 
a Nordic Country other than their own', at 
http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-
operation/agreements/treaties-and-agreements/passport-
affairs/protocol-concerning-the-exemption-of-nationals-
of-the-nordic-countries-from-the-obligation-to-have-a-
passport-or-residence-permit-while-resident-in-a-nordic-
country-other-than-their-own (viewed on: 28 January 
2011). 
6 e.g. health care, child benefits, social assistance, 
pensions or unemployment pay. 
common objectives and values than on 
integrating institutions”.7 
 
The changed party system: The 
dominance of the centre-right swept 
aside 
 
Iceland has a parliamentary system of 
government, and all governments in Iceland 
since independence, with the exception of one 
(due to the unequal distribution of 
parliamentary seats) and a few temporary 
minority governments, have been based on 
party coalitions. The President of Iceland is a 
figurehead, though the constitution gives him 
considerable powers. All presidents, except for 
the present one, have refrained from exercising 
their constitutional powers, except as regards 
fulfilling their responsibility to oversee the 
formation of governments after general 
elections (the parliamentary term is four years) 
or a fall of a government. The current president 
has thrice exercised his constitutional right to 
refer legislative bills approved by a 
parliamentary majority to a referendum. The 
Prime Minister leads the government, ministers 
are most often chosen from among the 
members of parliament and the parliamentary 
groups are traditionally very influential. 
 
In the last twenty years, the central government 
has transferred considerable powers to the local 
authorities, many of which have been too small 
to meet the responsibilities involved. Two-
thirds of the population of c. 320,000 live in 
the Greater Reykjavik area – Reykjavik itself 
being by far the largest local authority. The 
many local authorities in the sparsely 
populated regions are further weakened by the 
lack of regional authorities 
 
                                                 
7 Thomas, A.H. op. cit., p. 17. 
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The centre-right has dominated Icelandic 
politics since the Icelandic party system was 
created in the second and third decades of the 
twentieth century. The first left-wing 
government was created in 2009. The fact that 
the Icelandic right is united led to the 
dominance of the conservative Independence 
Party in the post-war period. The 
Conservatives were in office for 51 of the 69 
years since the creation of the Republic, often 
receiving nearly 40 per cent of the vote.
8
 
Originally, the Independence Party leadership 
sought ideas and policies from the other Nordic 
states. American influences became evident 
later. Since the 1980s, the party has been 
highly influenced by the neo-liberal policies of 
the Reagan and Thatcher era. It developed 
relations with the British Conservative Party 
and was influenced not only by its liberal 
economic and trade polices but also by its 
Euroscepticism. By contrast, the Social 
Democratic Parties were the most prevalent in 
the other Nordic states during this time. The 
centre-agrarian Progressive Party, the 
country’s second-largest party until 1999, has 
held a key position in government coalition-
building partly due to its ability to work with 
both the left and the right. 
 
The party system changed somewhat in 1999 
with the formation of the Social Democratic 
Alliance (SDA) by the SDP, the People’s 
Alliance (Socialists) and the Women’s 
Alliance, in order to challenge the dominance 
of the Conservatives. The SDA became the 
second-largest party, receiving nearly 27 per 
cent of the vote, leaving the Progressives in 
third place with just over 18 per cent. In the 
general election of 2009, a fundamental change 
occurred and the SDA became the largest party 
                                                 
8 Moreover, a small minority of the party’s MPs, under 
the leadership of its vice-chairman, led a government for 
three of the remaining 18 years when the Independence 
Party itself was in opposition. 
in parliament with 30 per cent of the vote; the 
Conservatives scored their worst-ever electoral 
result, with less than a quarter of the vote. The 
Left Green Movement, a splinter group from 
the People’s Alliance, some members of the 
Women’s Alliance and environmentalists who 
opposed the merger of the three parties in the 
SDA, gained over 20 per cent of the vote. 
Together with the SDA, they formed the first 
left-wing majority government. This left the 
Progressives in the fourth place within the 
traditional four-party system. However, since 
1971, a fifth party has usually been represented 
in Althingi: the most successful one was the 
Women’s Alliance (1983-1999). Then came 
the Citizens’ Movement, an offspring of the 
2008/2009 winter protest, who secured four out 
of 63 MPs elected in 2009. 
 
One of the important features of the Icelandic 
proportional-representation electoral system is 
the over-representation of the regional 
constituencies in the Althingi. Until 2003, the 
majority of MPs came from the regions, even 
though most of the electorate lived in the 
Greater Reykjavik area during the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Votes in the rural 
regions still carry considerable more weight 
(proportionally) than those in the urban area – 
so that the disproportionality between rural and 
urban regions is the greatest in Western 
Europe.
9
 As a result, the Althingi has been 
rather preoccupied with regional interests, 
particularly fishing and agriculture. 
 
Iceland’s uniqueness in the North 
 
Iceland shares many similarities with the other 
four Nordic states, such as: common traditions 
of open democratic government; a welfare 
                                                 
9
 Harðarson, Ó.Th. (2002), The Icelandic Electoral 
System 1844-1999, in A. Lijphart and B. Grofman (eds), 
The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the 
Nordic Countires , New York: Agathon Press, pp. 101-
166. 
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state; an attachment to national sovereignty and 
strong defence; a competitive market economy 
and a strong regional affinity, promoting a 
‘Nordic identity’ and Nordic cooperation.10 
Nevertheless, Iceland distinguishes itself from 
the others in many important features – three of 
which are discussed below. 
 
First, although Iceland is a mature 
parliamentary democracy, consensual decision-
making based on the corporatist model has not 
developed as it has in the other Nordic states.
11
 
Instead, Iceland’s decision-making continues 
to be based on sectoral corporatism following 
its emergence when agricultural interest groups 
gained a representational monopoly and 
privileged access to government
12
 in Iceland as 
in many other European states. Later, the 
expansion of the fishing industry gave it the 
same status as the agrarian lobby. These 
traditional leading sectors in the rural coastal 
regions gained sufficient strength to sideline 
other interests. They also achieved blocking 
power within the united right (the 
Independence Party), and the agrarian 
Progressive Party. Rural coastal interests still 
prevail, partly due to late industrialization 
(arriving only at the beginning of the twentieth 
century), export specialisation (marine 
products) and over-representation of rural areas 
in parliament. The aluminium sector (since the 
late 1960s) and the privatized financial sector 
(in the first decade of the 21
st
 century) were 
granted the same status and influence as the 
fisheries and agricultural sectors within this 
Icelandic sectoral-corporatist framework. In 
addition, unlike in the other Nordic states, 
                                                 
10 Miles, L. (1996), ‘Introduction’ in L. Miles (ed.), The 
European Union and the Nordic Countries, New York, 
Routledge, pp. 3-14. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Lehmbruch, G. (1984), ‘Concertation and the structure of 
corporatist networks’, in J.H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and 
Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 60-80. 
Iceland’s sectoral corporatism has never been 
characterized by “the voluntary, cooperative 
regulation of conflicts over economic and 
social issues through highly structured and 
interpenetrating political relationships between 
business, trade unions, and the state, 
augmented by political parties”.13 Hence, the 
conditions for economic flexibility and 
political stability were missing. In other words, 
the culture of consensus did not prevail. For 
instance, Iceland has continued to have the 
highest level of strikes among the OECD 
countries.
14
 This is in vivid contrast to the 
other Nordic states which are known for low 
levels of industrial disputes.
15
 
 
Second, Iceland, like the other Nordic states, 
has in place comprehensive welfare provisions 
and social and environmental standards.
16
 That 
said, the Icelandic welfare system is not as 
comprehensive or generous as those of the 
other Nordic states. This has created greater 
inequality than in the other states.
17
 Moreover, 
Icelandic governments have not prioritized 
environmental projection (with the exception 
of a successful policy, at least compared with 
other European states, on marine-resource 
sustainability). Governments have emphasised 
the importance of using natural resources such 
as hydro and geothermal electrical power and 
marine resources. This is manifested in their 
battle to continue whaling and the extent to 
which the aluminium industry has had 
privileged access to the administration. With 
                                                 
13 Katzenstein, P.J. (1985), Small States in World Markets: 
Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca and London, Cornell 
University Press, p. 32. 
14 Aðalsteinsson, G.D. (2006), ’Verkföll og verkfallstíðni á 
íslenskum vinnumarkaði 1976-2004’, Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla 
– A Web-based Magazine, 2(2), pp. 175-196. 
15 Miles, L. (1996), p. 7. 
16 Ibid.,  pp. 3-14. 
17 Ólafsson, S. (2006), ‘Aukinn ójöfnuður á Íslandi: áhrif 
stjórnmála og markaðar í fjölþjóðlegum samanburði’, 
Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla – A Web-based Magazine, 2(2), pp. 
129-156. 
 9 
 
the Conservatives in government, the structure 
of the Icelandic government’s decision-making 
was more in line with what Katzenstein 
describes as the American trend toward 
exclusion, rather than the inclusionary nature 
of the small European states’ corporatism.18 
Social movements, such as the new 
environmental movement, were explicitly, and 
deliberately, sidelined in governmental 
decision-making processes. This was the 
perception of most, it not all, social 
movements, such as the Organization of the 
Disabled, which became openly very critical of 
the government’s policies. 
 
Third, the Icelandic government, 
despite participating in a clear alliance with the 
Western Bloc during the Cold War, cannot be 
labelled ‘internationalist’ or a campaigner for 
free global trade like the other Nordic states.
19
 
Historically, Iceland was slow to adopt the 
liberal economic and trade policies of its 
counterparts in Western Europe. The Icelandic 
economy was characterised by trade 
restrictions and high tariffs until the 1960s.
20
 
One could say that Iceland has never opened 
up its borders except in return for gaining 
better market access for its marine exports. 
This was the case with EFTA membership in 
1970, the free-trade agreement with the EU in 
1972 and EEA membership in 1994. Iceland 
has campaigned for free trade in marine 
products but allied itself with those states 
within the WTO (including Norway) that have 
opposed further moves towards free trade in 
                                                 
18 Katzenstein, P.J. (1985), Small States in World 
Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca and 
London, Cornell University Press, pp. 22-30. 
19 Miles, L. (1996), ‘Introduction’ in L. Miles (ed.), The  
European Union and the Nordic Countries, New York, 
Routledge, pp. 7-8. 
20 Ásgeirsson, J.F. (2008), Þjóð í hafti: saga verslunarfjötra á 
Íslandi 1930-1960, Reykjavik: Ugla, p. 1-374. 
agricultural goods.
21
 Furthermore, Iceland did 
not give high priority to humanitarian missions 
and development aid until the late 1990s and 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.
22
 
Participation in the work of the United Nations 
has not been high on the agenda of Icelandic 
governments, with the exception of a brief 
period when Iceland campaigned to win a seat 
in the UN Security Council, but failed. One of 
the reasons why it failed was its lack of a track 
record within the UN and a lack of enthusiasm 
on the part of some Icelandic ministers.
23
  
 
Iceland’s foreign policy: A quest for 
self-determination and direct economic 
gains 
 
In the post-war period, Iceland’s foreign policy 
prioritised three objectives: the extension of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, firm defence 
arrangements, mainly by building a long-
lasting relationship with the US and 
membership of NATO, and improved market 
access for marine products (including a partial 
engagement in the European project). In 
addition, Iceland took full part in Nordic 
cooperation, as already discussed, and joined 
most of the post-war international 
organizations, but without playing an active 
role within them.
24
 In foreign policy, Icelandic 
                                                 
21 Einarsson, Á. (2007), ‘Landbúnaður og Evrópusambandið – 
álitaefni við aðild’, in S.B. Ómarsdóttir (ed.), Ný Staða Íslands 
í Utanríkismálum: Tengsl við Önnur Evrópulönd, Reykjavík, 
Alþjóðamálastofnun Háskóla Íslands, pp. 50-51. 
22 Haralz, J.H. (1997), Um Þróunarsamvinnu Íslands, 
Reykjavík, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and, Ingólfsson, H.Ö. 
and Haralz, J.H. (2003), Ísland og Þróunarlöndin: Álitsgerð 
um Þróunarsamvinnu Íslands og Þátttöku í Starfi 
Alþjóðastofnana, Reykjavík, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, pp. 
7-10. 
23 Thorhallsson, B. (2009), ‘Can small states choose their own 
size? The case of a Nordic state – Iceland’, in A.F. Cooper and 
T.M. Shaw (eds.), The Diplomacies of Small States: Between 
Vulnerability and Resilience, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 119-142. 
24 See, for instance, Alþingistíðindi B (1944) [Parliamentary 
record], pp. 2023-2029; Valdimarsson, V.U., Árnason, G.R. 
and Gunnarsson, G.Á. (1993), Ísland í Eldlínu Alþjóðamála: 
Stefnumótun og Samvinna Innan Sameinuðu Þjóðanna 1946-
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governments have preferred bilateral relations 
to multilateral relations within international 
institutions/organizations. 
 
The Cod Wars 
 
Iceland managed to extend its fisheries zone on 
a number of occasions, eventually to 200 
miles, despite heavy protests from powerful 
neighbours. This is particularly interesting 
because of its more limited capabilities 
compared to Britain, its main opponent. These 
‘victories’ no doubt reinforced Icelandic 
politicians’ view that Iceland could be 
successful on its own without having to 
negotiate and make compromises within 
multilateral international forums. This is not to 
say that the international environment did not 
contribute to Iceland’s success. On the 
contrary, the development of the law of the sea 
was in Iceland’s favour and the country’s 
strategic military position played a key role in 
British decisions to give in on the fishing-zone 
issue following pressure from the US and other 
NATO allies.
25
 Occasionally, the Icelandic 
government threatened to terminate the 
bilateral defence agreement with the US and 
leave NATO if Iceland did not get what it 
wanted.
26
 Furthermore, Iceland’s position as a 
small state, with marine products as almost its 
only exports, in a difficult dispute with a 
former world power engendered sympathy for 
its position.
27
 A ‘myth’ has developed among 
                                                                             
1980, Reykjavík, Alþjóðamálastofnun Háskóla Íslands, p. 50; 
Jónsson, A.K. (2004), Stjórnarráð Íslands 1904-1964, 2nd 
edition, Reykjavík, Sögufélag, p. 715. 
25 Jóhannesson, G.Th. (2002), ‘Tíu spurningar. Hugleiðingar 
um þorskastríðin’, in E.H. Halldórsdóttir (ed.), Íslenska 
Söguþingið 30. maí - 1. júní 2002: Ráðstefnurit, Reykjavík: 
Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla Íslands, p. 443. 
26 Ingimundarson, V. (2001), Uppgjör við Umheiminn: 
Samskipti Íslands, Bandaríkjanna og NATO 1960-1974: 
Íslensk Þjóðernishyggja, Vestrænt Samstarf og 
Landhelgisdeilan, Reykjavík, Vaka-Helgafell, pp. 211-
268. 
27 Jóhannesson, G.Th. (2002), ‘Tíu spurningar. 
Hugleiðingar um þorskastríðin’, in E.H. Halldórsdóttir 
Icelanders about ‘Iceland’s unilateral 
successes’ during the Cod Wars, which has 
strengthened Icelandic pride and national 
identity. Throughout the Cold War Icelandic 
politicians nurtured this ‘myth’ and were happy 
to capitalize on it. Thus, the Cod Wars 
reinforced bilateral solution-seeking at the 
expense of finding solutions within multilateral 
frameworks. 
 
Iceland’s closest ally - no longer present 
 
The closure of the US military base in Iceland 
in 2006 marked the end of an era in the 
country’s overseas relations – and a change in 
Iceland’s position on the political map. Iceland 
had enjoyed very close relations with its 
Western neighbour, the United States, since the 
Second World War. Until that time, the US 
administration had not shown any interest in 
forging closer relations with Iceland, despite 
some attempts made by Iceland. 
 
In 1941, Iceland concluded a broad defence 
agreement with the US: its defence was 
guaranteed and the US military secured the use 
of facilities in the country. Iceland was now 
part of the US defence territory and remained 
so up until 2002. The agreement also included 
provisions on trade and other commercial 
benefits which laid the foundation for 
economic assistance – the highest, per capita, 
that the US provided in Europe – and 
flourishing trade relations between the two 
countries. Importantly, the US government 
recognized Iceland as a republic and the two 
allies exchanged ambassadors as provided for 
by the agreement.
28
 Some Icelandic politicians 
                                                                             
(ed.), Íslenska Söguþingið 30. maí - 1. júní 2002: 
Ráðstefnurit, Reykjavík: Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla 
Íslands, p. 448. 
28 Department of State Bulletin (1941), 'Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's Message to Congress on U.S. Occupation of 
Iceland', at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/ 
1941/410707a.html (viewed on: 28 January 2011). 
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also found it appealing that Iceland was no 
longer on its own in the British sphere of 
influence in the North Atlantic.
29
 This later 
became evident in the Cod Wars with Britain 
in the decades following the Second World 
War. However, after the end of the Cold War, 
the weakness of Iceland’s bilateral 
arrangement with the US was exposed as the 
changed geopolitical landscape reduced 
Iceland’s significance and eventually led to the 
withdrawal of US support. This was reflected 
in the US’s refusal to help Iceland in the 
Icesave dispute with Britain and the 
Netherlands. Iceland was suddenly on its own 
in the middle of the North Atlantic 
 
Indeed, when the Cold War started, Iceland 
found itself in the middle of rising tensions in 
the GIUK-gap (between Greenland and the 
United Kingdom) involving the superpowers. 
For this reason the island became an important 
military base for defence against a Soviet 
attack on the east coast of the USA and the 
West European coast line. Iceland became a 
founding member of NATO, which signalled a 
marked policy change from the neutrality that 
had been a cornerstone of its foreign policy in 
the inter-war period.
30
 
 
For most of the post-war period, all Icelandic 
governments, except for two left-of-centre 
ones, prioritised good relations with the US. 
However, a new bilateral defence agreement 
with the US signed in 1951 and the presence of 
a US military base, were extremely 
controversial and overshadowed other political 
issues in the country during the Cold War. This 
                                                 
29 Ingimundarson, V. (2002), ’Viðhorf Bandaríkjanna til 
íslenskrar hagstjórnar á 5. og 6. áratugnum’, in J.H. Haralz, 
Frá Kreppu til Viðreisnar: Þættir um Hagstjórn á Íslandi á 
Árunum 1930-1960, Reykjavík, Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag, 
pp. 327-344. 
30 Ingimundarson, V. (1996), Ísland í Eldlínu Kalda 
Stríðsins: Samskipti Íslands og Bandaríkjanna 1945-
1960, Reykjavík, Vaka-Helgafell. 
dispute proved to be more divisive than the 
economic and social issues that had originally 
given rise to the longest-standing parties in the 
Icelandic political landscape.
31
 The political 
discourse was characterised by concepts of 
nationalism and the dispute sharpened 
nationalistic feeling.
32
 
 
The close relationship between Iceland and the 
US government is manifested by the fact that 
Iceland was one of the few Western European 
countries to participate in the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ supporting the US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 and its ‘war on terror’. Iceland also 
supported the US in the wars in Afghanistan 
and Kosovo, and the US government’s position 
on the enlargement of NATO, both when it 
opposed the admission of more members in 
1999 and when it agreed to admit new 
members a few years later. 
 
Iceland’s defence policy has relied entirely on 
policy-making within the US administration 
and NATO. This is because limited knowledge 
in the fields of defence among Icelandic 
politicians and civil servants prevented Iceland 
from developing a comprehensive defence 
policy. For instance, one person in the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs handled all relations with 
NATO in 1989, and the Icelandic delegation to 
NATO consisted of three officials and two 
staff secretaries. The Norwegian and Danish 
delegations were much larger at this time, 
comprising 30 and 40 officials respectively.
33
 
 
                                                 
31 Harðarson, Ó.Th. and Kristinsson, G.H. (1987), ‘The 
Icelandic parliamentary election of 1987’, Electoral Studies, 
6(3), pp. 219-234. 
32 Ingimundarson, V. (2001), Uppgjör við Umheiminn: 
Samskipti Íslands, Bandaríkjanna og NATO 1960-1974: 
Íslensk Þjóðernishyggja, Vestrænt Samstarf og 
Landhelgisdeilan, Reykjavík, Vaka-Helgafell, pp. 331-
355. 
33 Jónsson, A. (1989), Iceland, NATO and the Keflavík Base, 
Reykjavík, Öryggismálanefnd, p 16. 
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Icelandic governments – with the two 
exceptions already mentioned - fought hard 
against any reduction of the US military 
presence in the country up until the closure of 
the military base. Governments have never 
accepted that the country’s defence would be 
bolstered by taking part in the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
development of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). This is contrary to the 
case in Norway, where governments have been 
attracted to the EU for security reasons.
34
 Nor 
has Iceland taken an active part in the policy-
making processes of other security 
organizations in Europe, i.e. the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Western European Union 
(WEU). However, in 2001 Iceland established 
a civil peacekeeping mission (the Icelandic 
Crisis Response Unit) in order to operate 
within international organizations, mainly 
NATO, following increased pressure by other 
NATO members for Iceland to share some of 
the defence burden and become more active 
within the alliance.
35
 The decision to establish 
the unit was taken in the hope of attracting 
greater goodwill from the US and other NATO 
allies: it was hoped that in return, the US might 
be willing to prolong its military presence in 
the country which it had been scaling down 
since the end of the Cold War. 
 
Since the closure of the US military base, 
Iceland has made civil security arrangements 
(mainly concerning its waters) with Britain, 
Denmark, Norway and Canada
36
 and 
                                                 
34 Archer, C. and Sogner, I. (1998), Norway, European 
Integration and Atlantic Security, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 
pp.128-136. 
35 Bailes, A. and Thorhallsson, B. (2006), ‘Iceland and 
the European Security and Defence Policy’, in A. Bailes, 
G. Herolf and B. Sundelius (eds.), The Nordic Countries 
and the European Security and Defence Policy, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 328-348. 
36 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2007a., 
‘Grannríkjasamstarf', at: 
concerning airspace surveillance with various 
NATO member states such as France, 
Germany and Britain and, more radically the 
non NATO Nordic states Sweden and Finland, 
allowing the temporary presence of their jet 
fighters in the country.
37
 Icelanders saw the US 
decision to close its base and, two years later, 
not to help Iceland out in the 2008 credit 
crunch, as a clear sign of a lack of willingness 
to provide the country with political and 
defence shelter. This is a sharp break with the 
past, when the US not only provided the 
country with a military presence to defend it 
but always came to its economic rescue up 
until the late 1960s. The new left-wing 
government, under pressure from the Left 
Greens, has been scaling down Iceland’s 
activities in NATO, closing the newly-created 
Icelandic Defence Agency (which took over 
many of the responsibilities of the US military 
in the country – though without creating 
military units) and distributing its work among 
civilian public institutions.  
 
Icelandic-US relations are not likely to return 
to what they were prior to the closure of the 
base – despite the existence of the defence 
treaty between the two states. Icelandic 
governments have already started to look to the 
East, to their European neighbours, for security 
and defence cooperation. Interestingly, this 
was not a deliberate choice. They were forced 
to turn to Europe after the US abandoned the 
country. This shift has been welcomed by the 
Social Democrats, but the Left Greens, now in 
government for the first time, reject all calls for 
security and defence cooperation. 
 
                                                                             
http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/verkefni/althjoda-og-
oryggissvid/varnar-og-oryggismal/grannrikjasamstarf/ 
(viewed on: 28 January 2011). 
37 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2007b., ‘Loftrýmisgæsla 
NATO við Ísland Hefst í Mars 2008’, at: 
http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettir/nr/3961 (viewed 
on: 28 January 2011). 
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Partial engagement in the European project 
 
Historically, all political parties have opposed 
membership of the EU, with the exception of 
the Social Democratic Party in the period 
1994-1999 and the SDA
38
 from 2002. This 
scepticism towards EU membership is in sharp 
contrast to the view of most politicians in 
Norway and Denmark since the early 1960s 
and politicians in Sweden and Finland since 
the early 1990s.
39
 Several reasons have been 
put forward explaining the reluctance of the 
Icelandic politicians to participate in the 
European project. The most common 
explanation is Iceland’s insistence on 
unrestricted control over its waters and 
unwillingness to join the EU’s Common 
Fisheries Policy.
40
 Other explanations include: 
the political discourse on independence and 
sovereignty in all debates on external 
relations
41, Iceland’s close defence and trade 
relationship with the US (the country had no 
need to seek security guarantees from the EU 
because of its defence agreement with the US) 
and the smallness of its central administration 
(its lack of staff and other resources until the 
mid-1990s to gather information on any 
considerable scale on the development of 
European integration, thus making the 
government rely on powerful interests groups 
in the fisheries and agrarian sectors when 
                                                 
38 The left-of-centre parties (the SDP, the People’s 
Alliance (the former Socialist and Communist party) and 
the Women’s Alliance) formed the Social Democratic 
Alliance (SDA) in 1999.  
39 Svåsand, L. and Lindström, U. (1996), ‘Scandinavian 
political parties and the European Union’, in J. Gaffney (ed.), 
Political Parties and the European Union, London and New 
York, Routledge, pp. 205-219. 
40 Thorhallsson, B. and Vignisson, H.T. (2004), ‘Life is first 
and foremost saltfish’, in B. Thorhallsson (ed.), Iceland and 
European Integration: On the Edge, New York, Routledge, pp. 
67-102. 
41 Hálfdanarson, G. (2004), Discussing Europe: Icelandic 
nationalism and European integration, in B. Thorhallsson, 
Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge, New York, 
Routledge, p. 140. 
formulating its European policy).
42
 
Furthermore, three distinctive features of the 
Icelandic political elite have contributed to its 
reluctance to participate in the European 
project. First, there is an unequal distribution 
of seats in the Althingi, in favour of the rural 
constituencies. This gives the primary sectors, 
fishing and agriculture – which oppose EU 
membership – a pivotal role in decision-
making. Second, Iceland’s foreign relations 
have been concentrated on states which stand 
outside the core of the European Union. In 
other words, the outside contacts of Icelandic 
politicians, bureaucrats and the business 
community have been with their counterparts 
in the Nordic states, Britain and the US – not 
with those of the European core, i.e. the 
original member states and states which are 
most in favour of European integration. The 
idea and the importance of the European 
project are felt less strongly in the middle of 
the Atlantic Ocean than on the European 
Continent and its immediate surroundings. The 
same could be said until quite recently about 
the pattern of media, cultural and educational 
ties. Third, and importantly, the Icelandic 
political elite has had a realist conception of 
foreign policy. This is mainly shaped by a 
constant commitment to national self-
determination, a search for concrete economic 
advantages from all overseas activities and 
preference for bilateral relations over 
multilateralism.
43
 
 
That said, in July 2009, the Icelandic 
parliament narrowly approved a motion to 
apply for EU membership. The Social 
                                                 
42  Thorhallsson, B. and Vignisson, H.T. (2004), ‘Life is 
first and foremost saltfish’, in B. Thorhallson (ed.), 
Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge, New 
York, Routledge, pp. 78-86. 
43 Kristinsson, G.H. and Thorhallsson, B. (2004), ‘The euro-
sceptical political elite’, in B. Thorhallsson  (ed.), Iceland and 
European Integration: On the Edge, New York, Routledge, pp. 
145-160. 
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Democrats found themselves in a strong 
position - especially after their election victory 
and the outlook of a majority in parliament for 
an EU application. The SDA even went as far 
as insisting on an EU application as a 
precondition for the continuation of its 
coalition with the Independence Party (late 
2008) and the creation of the new majority 
government with the Left Greens (spring 
2009). 
 
The economic crash, which started with the fall 
of the ISK in March 2008, clearly stimulated 
the ongoing EU debate and led to a swift 
change of attitude towards the vulnerability of 
the economy and its small currency. These 
events made many Icelanders question the 
country’s traditional domestic and foreign 
policies, including the reluctance to become 
engaged in the European project. This opened a 
window of opportunity for pro-European 
forces and EU membership became the main 
election issue in April 2009. The SDA’s 
economic plan for recovery was based on EU 
membership
44
, emphasising the benefits for 
consumers and enterprises of lower prices of 
goods, the adoption of the Euro within the EU 
and opportunities for aid for rural areas, 
agriculture and the tourist industry from the 
EU’s Structural Funds. Supporters of a closer 
engagement in the European project have, in 
fact, always cited the economic benefits, and 
won approval by emphasising them. This had 
also been the case with both EFTA and EEA 
membership.
45
 
                                                 
44 Social Democratic Alliance [Samfylkingin] 2009, 
‘Stjórnmálaályktun’, at 
http://www.samfylkingin.is/Stefnum%C3%A1l/Sam%C3%BE
ykktir_landsfundar (viewed on 28 January 2011). 
45 Thorhallsson, B. and Vignisson, H.T. (2004), ‘The first 
steps: Iceland’s policy on European integration from the 
foundation of the republic to 1972’, in B. Thorhallson (ed.), 
Iceland and European Integration: On the Edge, New York, 
Routledge, pp. 28-33; Thorhallsson, B. and Vignisson, H.T. 
(2004), ‘A controversial step: mermbership of the EEA’, in B. 
Thorhallson (ed.), Iceland and European Integration: On the 
Edge, New York, Routledge, pp. 38-50. 
The Social Democrats may have grasped the 
opportunity to apply for membership, based on 
their interpretation of Iceland’s economic 
interests, but other parties have not followed 
them in their pro-European approach, despite 
the economic crash. The Left Green Movement 
remains steadfastly opposed to EU 
membership. It reluctantly permitted an EU 
application in order to form a government and 
to have an open democratic EU debate in the 
country at large. 
 
The Independence Party advocates withdrawal 
of the EU membership application – though it 
is deeply divided on the issue. It advocated a 
unilateral adoption of the euro just before the 
general election in 2009 in order to appeal to 
its pro-European voters. While in government 
from 1991 to 2009, the party’s opposition to 
EU membership became fiercer and was based 
on several arguments: Iceland’s fisheries sector 
would be seriously damaged by EU 
membership; Iceland would not be able to 
conduct its own economic policy; adopting the 
euro would be fatal to the economy; as a small 
state, Iceland would be powerless within the 
EU and unable to defend its interests; corporate 
taxes might rise due to membership and 
regulations from Brussels would place a 
burden on businesses and the community at 
large.
46
 The EU was seen as standing in the 
way of the government’s agenda – forcing it to 
make more domestic and international 
compromises of the type it had already been 
obliged to make within the EEA framework. 
                                                 
46 Oddsson, D. (1995), Ávarp forsætisráðherra, Davíðs 
Oddssonar, 17. júní 1995, at 
http://www.forsaetisraduneyti.is/radherra/raedur-og-
greinar/nr/986 (viewed on 2 February 2011); Oddsson, D. 
(2001), Ávarp Davíðs Oddssonar forsætisráðherra á fundi 
Samtaka um vestræna samvinnu og Varðbergs, at 
http://www.forsaetisraduneyti.is/radherra/raedur-og-
greinar/nr/355 (viewed on 2 February 2011); Oddsson, D. 
2002, Ávarp forsætisráðherra á aðalfundi Samtaka 
atvinnulífsins, at http://forsaetisraduneyti.is/radherra/raedur-
og-greinar/nr/365 (viwed on 2 February 2011); Gissurarson, 
H.H. (2001), Hvernig Getur Ísland Orðið Ríkasta Land í 
Heimi?, Reykjavík, Nýja bókafélagið. 
 15 
 
The Progressive Party also advocates a 
withdrawal of the EU membership application 
though its European policy remains highly 
contested. Although it formally changed its 
policy towards an EU application in early 
2009, two-thirds of its MPs voted against an 
application in the summer of that year. Hence, 
the party’s new leadership has turned the party 
against the EU accession process and fiercely 
campaigns against it. Moreover, the MPs of the 
Citizens’ Movement remain sceptical of EU 
accession and three out of their four MPs voted 
against the EU application though they had 
advocated EU negotiations in the general 
election. 
 
Accordingly, the Social Democrats are on their 
own on the path to membership, though a small 
number of MPs of other parties are 
sympathetic to the idea. The party leadership of 
the Left Green Movement tolerates the formal 
pro-European policy of the government, led by 
the SDA, in the firm belief that Iceland will not 
obtain a satisfactory accession treaty and that 
the treaty which will be offered to it will be 
rejected in a referendum. Traditional Icelandic 
Euroscepticism is still alive and well. 
 
For nearly three years, 2008-2011, the political 
discussion in Iceland was dominated by the 
‘Icesave’47 dispute between Iceland, on the one 
hand, and the Netherlands and Britain on the 
other. The dispute raised nationalist feelings 
and sidelined discussion of the EU application. 
On a number of occasions, Britain and the 
Netherlands, with formal and informal 
approval of other European states (including 
the other Nordic states in the beginning), 
blocked Iceland’s IMF assistance after the 
economic crash. 
                                                 
47The dispute was centred on whether, and under which 
conditions, Iceland was to reimburse Britain and the 
Netherlands after the collapse of the Icelandic bank, 
Landsbanki, which held large amounts of British and 
Dutch savings that were lost in the 2008 financial crisis.  
In the public debate, the EU and its member 
states have been blamed for the IMF blockage 
and for standing in the way of Iceland’s 
economic recovery – despite the fact that the 
EU has, on several occasions, stated that the 
dispute is a bilateral matter involving the states 
concerned. Iceland has adopted the EU’s 
regulations on finances, on which the British 
and Dutch claims are based, through its 
membership of the EEA, and has requested that 
the EU step in to settle the dispute, but without 
any success. Hence, the EU is seen by many as 
not being able to provide Iceland with 
economic and political shelter, and many 
politicians and voters have also depicted it as a 
bully standing by while larger states oppress a 
small defenceless neighbour.  As a result, the 
pro-European forces have had a difficult time 
making their case in an atmosphere of 
nationalism where Icelanders generally feel 
that all of their closest neighbouring states, 
except for the Faroe Islands, have deserted 
them in a time of great need.  
 
The state of public opinion on EU membership 
has clearly been affected by the Icesave 
dispute. Since early 2009, the majority of 
voters have stated their opposition to 
membership in opinion polls
48
, contrasting 
with the previous twelve-year period where 
nearly all polls indicated a majority in favour 
of membership, peaking just after the 
economic collapse.
49
 Thus, public opinion on 
Iceland’s approach to the European question 
has fluctuated considerably in the last few 
years. This is not surprising, since Icelandic 
society at large remains in flux after the 
                                                 
48
 Capacent Iceland., Þjóðarpúls Gallup, July 2010. 
49 Thorhallsson, B. (2002), ‘The sceptical political elite versus 
the pro-European public: the case of Iceland’, Scandinavian 
Studies, 74(3), pp. 349-378; The Federation of Icelandic 
Industries., opinion polls conducted by Capacent Gallup for the 
Federation of Icelandic Industries, at: 
http://www.si.is/malaflokkar/althjodlegt-
samstarf/evropumal/skodanakannanir/ (viewed on 1 December 
2010). 
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economic crash, suffering both from the 
financial consequences of the crash itself and 
from political instability. 
 
Smallness of the central bureaucracy 
 
The lack of expertise and limited human 
resources in Iceland’s central bureaucracy have 
hindered it from engaging in long-term policy-
making concerning European and security 
affairs and foreign policy in general. The 
central bureaucracy cannot be blamed, 
however, and it is remarkable how much the 
Icelandic Foreign Service has achieved despite 
its smallness, e.g. in the EFTA negotiations in 
the 1960s and the negotiations leading to the 
EEA Agreement. However, its limitations 
become nowhere more obvious than in the 
Icesave negotiations with Britain and the 
Netherlands. In 2010, 160 people were 
employed in the Icelandic Foreign Service and 
Iceland had 21 embassies and missions abroad. 
The numbers have dropped somewhat after the 
financial crisis (before it, about 220 employees 
worked in the Foreign Service) due to drastic 
cuts in the Foreign Service’s budget. To put 
these figures into perspective, only 85 people 
worked in the Foreign Service in 1985.
50
 
 
Ministers and governments have obviously not 
given priority to developing reliable or 
comprehensive knowledge of European and 
security affairs within the bureaucracy. The 
Foreign Service barely had sufficient resources 
to concentrate on Iceland’s core interests as 
defined by the government such as the 
extension of the fisheries zone and finding a 
suitable solution for Icelandic marine exports 
to the EU. Moreover, the limited focus on 
long-term policy-making in the central 
bureaucracy has made ministries very 
                                                 
50 Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2011), Information by email 
provided by the Ministry’s spokesperson. (received on 7 
January 2011). 
dependent on interest groups and other external 
assistance.
51
 For this reason, the powerful 
fisheries and agricultural lobbies have enjoyed 
a privileged position in Iceland’s international 
negotiations where these touched upon their 
interests as they perceived them 
 
At present, the Foreign Service and other 
governmental departments still rely on these 
and other powerful interest groups in 
formulating Iceland’s negotiating objectives 
concerning EU accession. The central 
bureaucracy is capable of implementing the 
EEA legal framework
52
, which is most often 
implemented without any consideration being 
given to Iceland’s unique features such as 
smallness.
53
 Furthermore, while the Foreign 
Service may have the expertise to take part in 
international negotiations – including those on 
EU accession – the bureaucracy at large lacks 
solid knowledge of important sectors of the EU 
such as fisheries, agricultural, finance and rural 
and regional development in order to define 
comprehensive negotiation positions in the EU 
accession talks. 
 
Iceland’s limited activity within the UN and 
the Council of Europe provides further 
examples of the consequences of the lack of 
enthusiasm about international participation. 
Iceland did not take over the rotating 
chairmanship of the Council of Europe until 
1999 because until then it argued that it did not 
                                                 
51 Kristinsson, G.H. (1993), Valdakerfið fram til 
viðreisnar 1900-1959, in G. Hálfdanarson and S. 
Kristjánsson (eds.), Íslensk Þjóðfélagsþróun 1880-1990, 
Reykjavík, Félagsvísindastofnun Háskóla Íslands and 
Sagnfræðistofnun Háskóla Íslands, pp. 321-354. 
52 Council of the European Union 2010, ‘Council Conclusions 
on EU Relations with EFTA Countries’, 3060th General 
Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 14 December, at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/ 
docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118458.pdf (viewed on 2 February 
2011). 
53 Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis (2010), Aðdragandi og Orsakir 
Falls Íslensku Bankanna 2008 og Tengdir Atburðir, 5. bindi, 
Reykjavík, Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis, pp. 22-23. 
 17 
 
have the administrative capacity to tackle the 
duties involved. Similarly, Iceland has not 
undertaken the presidency of the UN General 
Assembly as, for instance, Malta did in 1990, 
Lebanon in 1958 and Ireland in 1960-61. 
 
Moreover, Iceland was the last of the Nordic 
states to decide to apply for a seat on the UN 
Security Council in 1998. This decision was 
taken without any preparation and policy 
analysis – no documents exist about the 
government’s decision. The financial burden of 
international co-operation is still employed as 
an argument in the debate on whether or not 
the country should become more active 
internationally. The cost of running for the 
Security Council seat and sitting on the 
Council was heavily criticised by leading 
politicians.
54
 Furthermore, the application to 
join the Security Council was criticised 
because it did not give Iceland any direct 
benefits
55
 and doubt was cast on the country’s 
administrative capacity to participate in the 
Security Council.
56
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Iceland’s primary foreign policy objectives 
throughout the twentieth century were to 
secure full control over its territory (land and 
waters), improve market access for its fisheries 
products overseas and guarantee its defence. 
All political parties subscribed to these aims, 
though they differed on how to achieve them. 
Membership of supranational institutions like 
the EU was seen by most politicians as 
contradicting these aims. However, 
                                                 
54 See, for instance, Morgunblaðið 2005a, “Verra en í 
Eurovision”, 2 March p. 4; Morgunblaðið 2005b, Óöruggt sæti 
í öryggisráði, 30 April, p. 34; Schram, A. (2005), ‘Áleitnar 
spurningar hafa vaknað um kostnað’, Morgunblaðið, 30 April, 
p. 10. 
55 Morgunblaðið 2005c, Öryggisráð og aðrar leiðir, 27 January, 
p. 26. 
56 Friðriksson, O. 2005, ‘Vaxandi efasemdir eru um möguleika 
Íslands’, Morgunblaðið, 24 January, p. 26f. 
membership of EFTA and EEA was a practical 
choice for economic reasons and participation 
in the Schengen scheme was undertaken to 
secure the ‘continuation’ of the Nordic 
passport union. These agreements, together 
with the defence agreement with the US, have 
been perceived by most politicians as serving 
Icelandic core national interests, in terms of 
economics and security. 
 
Late industrialization and modernization have 
contributed to a steadfast belief in the 
uniqueness of the nation. The smallness of the 
society and its insularity have shaped the 
country’s political discourse and foreign 
policy. Iceland’s foreign policy still bears the 
hallmark of the past. Accordingly, the political 
discourse has been structured by a quest for 
self-determination, protection of identity and 
the concept of preserving the country’s 
sovereignty and independence. This 
combination, and politicians’ experience and 
perceptions about how Icelandic interests could 
be best served, led to an international approach 
which emphasized bilateralism at the expense 
of multilateralism. 
 
However, the vulnerability of the small 
economy and its lack of political and economic 
shelter in the latest global financial crisis have 
led many to question the traditional internal 
and external polices. The Social Democrats 
have undertaken a hard-fought battle to change 
them by applying for membership of the 
European Union. 
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